TL 4197
AA
CIDAC
Centro de Documentação

NOTES ON THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE

based on an international visit

7.6.80 - 18.8.80

Pat Walsh

Staff member of Action for World Development
Coordinator East Timor Relief Appeal

Introduction 1

Indonesian perceptions of East Timor 1

The military/administrative situation in East Timor 4

The Churches and East Timor 8

  (a) The Catholic Church in East Timor 8

  (b) The Vatican and East Timor 11

  (c) The Indonesian Catholic Church and East Timor 12

  (d) The Protestant Churches and East Timor 13

The economic/aid situation in East Timor 17

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and East Timor 18

The June 1980 US Congressional Hearing on aid in East Timor . . 24

Australian NGO aid to East Timor; a recommendation 25

East Timorese refugees in Portugal and Jakarta 26

The family reunion program 28

Appendix: media interviews given 30

Christmas 1980

Action for World Development
183 Gertrude St., Fitzoy 3065
Australia

Introduction

This is an expanded version of a summary report presented to a meeting held in Melbourne, August 20, 1980.
Present at that meeting were the following seven Australian aid agencies: Austcare, Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Save the Children Fund, Community Aid Abroad, World Vision, Australian Catholic Relief, and Asia Partnership; two representatives of the Timorese community; four Church organisations: Action for World Development, World Christian Action, the Uniting Church, and Asia Bureau Australia; the Department of Foreign Affairs; the Australian Red Cross; Timor Information Service; the Australian Council for Overseas Aid; and three organisations involved in refugee work: the Ecumenical Migration Centre, the North Richmond Family Care Centre, and RAFT - the campaign to Reunite In Australia the Families of Timor.

My trip took me to eight countries over a period of ten weeks (7.6.80 - 18.8.80). The countries visited were: USA, Britain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy and Indonesia.
The occasion of the trip was a US Congressional Hearing into East Timor held in Washington on June 10, 1980 which I attended on behalf of ACFOA.

The trip itself was both a fact-finding and a political exercise. My intention was to learn what I could about East Timor from those organisations working inside the country, to share this and what I already knew with others, and to identify the attitudes of those individuals and organisations I knew had the capacity to determine in some way the future of East Timor and the East Timorese. It was also my intention - through the media and personal contact, to place on the international agenda (as the editorial in the May 1980 ACFOA Development Dossier had stated) the issues of family reunions and the plight of East Timorese refugees abroad and to generate action in support of the fundamental issue of self-determination in East Timor.
For all of this there was a clear mandate from ACFOA and the seven agencies sponsoring the East Timor Relief Appeal of which I am the coordinator. These bodies have since adopted and begun to act on the recommendations I made.

Generally speaking, I was struck by the level of awareness, commitment - and frustration, about East Timor in all of these (mainly centre) countries, especially amongst the many individuals and agencies one would expect to know about this situation. The general public is less aware and more needs to be done through mainstream outlets to educate them, particularly those accessible through the churches, unions, agencies, the education system, and the political parties. However, though it has taken a long time, it is true East Timor has been registered as a priority concern and will continue as such as the many requests for more information indicate. Australia has an important role in this regard.

I am grateful to the many people who taught me so much in the areas of organisation and analysis. Nevertheless I did not return with a host of new revelations and recommendations for the trip also confirmed not only that we enjoy strong support and respect for our position but also that our analysis and policy have been essentially correct.

The identities of many of my sources cannot be revealed in this report for obvious reasons. Names have been supplied only where I judged there is no danger to the people in question. The report assumes some familiarity with the subject on the part of its readers. It is not an exhaustive treatment. At best it is a set of notes towards an improved understanding.

I Indonesian perceptions of East Timor

What little news there is about East Timor in the Government controlled media generally conveys the impression that the East Timorese are happily integrated and that the 27th Province is developing rapidly.

Newspapers and the Government TV showed Timorese flag-bearers and athletic teams participating in the Independence Day celebrations in Jakarta around August 17. The East Asian and Pacific junior middlweight title fight on August 15 between the Indonesian champion - burly Thomas Americo of East Timor, and his hapless victim from South Korea, was telecast live from Surabaya and widely reported in the press the following day. Americo had apparently developed his striking physique carrying supplies for the Indonesian army in Timor where he had been 'discovered' by an army officer.

Indonesians who visit Taman Mini, the park on the outskirts of Jakarta divided into 27 sections each representing a province of Indonesia and each boasting a model dwelling typical of its area, can now visit the Timor Timur section, a visible symbol of integration opened in April 1980 by President Suharto, stocked with implements and art and craft from East Timor on loan from Madame Tien Suharto's collection, and staffed by two timid Timorese youth.

But very few know of, or at least speak about, the secret hospital in a Jakarta suburb specially created by Madame Suharto for the maimed and permanently handicapped Indonesian soldiers wounded in East Timor, or of the thousands (estimates varied from 3000 to 10.000) of Indonesian soldiers killed in the Timor campaign and buried without recognition, or of the many sick and wounded soldiers at Subroto Hospital. Tight secrecy about these matters is, of course, mandatory. How can the Government satisfactorily explain the suffering and death-toll on both sides in a country which, the public has been told, wanted to be part of Indonesia.

Despite Government misinformation and secrecy, however, a significant well-placed minority are well-informed about East Timor. MP's, agencies, public servants, church people and groups like the Catholic Union of Women, have all visited Timor. Detailed reports have been circulated at high levels in the Protestant and Catholic churches. Information on East Timor within Indonesia is no longer a Government/Military monopoly.

With the exception of Brigadier-General Saronto of the Indonesian Red Cross, everyone I spoke to is distressed at what has happened there. One Indonesian MP charged that the Government "had made a mess of East Timor" and that "the bulk of the people are now worse off than they were under Portugal". A member of a political party volunteered that "East Timor is a very sad situation". A military chaplain on active duty in East Timor spoke repeatedly of the "suffering and many problems".

There is some awareness of Indonesian activity in relation to Timor before December 1975. One source spoke of a military contact in Kupang who reported that he was one of the first to go to East Timor in 1974 when, disguised as a journalist, he was sent to collect intelligence. A lawyer, in prison at the time, learnt of the activities in East Timor of the RPKAD soldiers (the elite "Red Beret" commando regiment) guarding him when his guards started growing beards and duty rosters were rotated more than usual. He was informed that, pre-August 1975, these troops infiltrated across the border into East Timor where, with some internal support, they terrorised the population into moving across the border into West Timor. There they worked amongst these refugees, recruiting and training. This same person says he was informed that the Australian journalists were deliberately murdered on the direct orders of senior officers, and that one escaped only to be executed later the same day. The army, he believes, has the journalists' film. Witnesses to the crime are known to this lawyer but they refuse to speak at this point.

Indonesians attribute this activity in 1975 to Ali Murtopo and Benny Moerdani, both of whom are considered to be hard, ruthless men. Murtopo, under intensive care for a heart condition at the time of my visit, was characterised by a Golkar official as "brilliant, ruthless and unscrupulous". It was widely agreed that under the control of these two men, the early stages of the Indonesian occupation had been incompetent, cruel and undisciplined. Cars, freezers and much else were stolen by the army; empty houses were stripped. According to a former army man, every battalion except those from Aceh and West Irian (two other trouble spots), was thrown into the East Timor campaign at the height of the conflict - in all some 50 battalions. According to the lawyer referred to above, Murtopo was motivated by self-interest. To restore his fading political fortunes he needed money and he needed to win control of the RPKAD. Above all he needed to regain political ground lost in 1974 at the time of the abortive Malari affair of which he was the organiser. According to this source, though Suharto and Malik were reluctant to get involved, Murtopo was able to use the Pertamina scandal to blackmail Suharto into cooperation.

Though East Timor is considered to have had the worst of it, the situation there was frequently compared with West Irian in that the same looting and cruelty characterised both military operations with the same alienating effect on the people. As in East Timor, spies disguised as taxi drivers and waiters operate in West Irian. It is expected East Timor will be subjected to the same developmental imbalance and the same transmigration strategy as West Irian.

Ordinary citizens informed me they thought Fretilin were communist and that the Russians were involved in East Timor. Taxi-drivers said they had heard it was a terribly primitive place. The following rationale for Indonesia's annexation was given by the army chaplain referred to above: Indonesia had to go in to prevent East Timor falling into Russian or Chinese hands. Eleven Fretilin from Lisbon had studied in the Soviet Union. Under Fretilin, impoverished East Timor would have sought aid from Russia, which then would have taken Indonesia and moved on to annex Australia. Another account of Government thinking offered a refinement on this crude scenario by arguing that the Government's action was a logical outcome of its virulent hatred of all forms of communism and, despite its membership of the non-aligned bloc, of its close economic ties with the capitalist West. The West, in particular ASEAN, PNG, Australia and possibly the EEC, had virtually required Indonesia to integrate East Timor to prevent its predicted slide as an independent country into foreign communist control. On the other hand, the lawyer already mentioned considered Ramos Horta too intelligent to link up with the Soviet Union or China, thereby playing into Indonesia's hands by providing it with the excuse it needed to intervene.

Another opinion advanced was that the Government had promoted its East Timor campaign as a sacred mission to liberate East Timor from Portuguese imperialism (hence the references in many quarters to the appalling poverty in Timor). In fact, according to this source, the annexation was unconstitutional. The founding fathers of the Indonesian republic, Sukarno and Hatta, had, contrary to the pan-Indonesia propositions of Mohammed Yamin, defined Indonesia's boundaries as co-extensive with the Dutch colony thereby excluding East Timor along with North Kalimantan etc. from the new republic. Though boundaries are not mentioned in the Constitution itself, they are referred to in the accompanying constitutional background notes which enjoy considerable status. **

With only one exception, however, all who have been to Timor informed me they thought Fretilin were not communist (mentioning, on a couple of occasions they had been trained in the seminary). Rather they were nationalists who wanted independence ('berdiri sendiri: to stand on their own feet'). This perception was forcefully put on a number of occasions,

---

**

Hamish McDonald would dispute this. In Suharto's Indonesia (Fontana, 1980) he writes: "The 1945 constitutional committee sympathised with arguments advanced by Mohammad Yamin which included East Timor (and West New Guinea, North Borneo and Malaya) as part of a Pan-Indonesian nation both on ethnic grounds and on claims of an earlier unity under the Majapahit dynasty. More out of simple anti-imperialism, Sukarno endorsed the Yamin idea, and it was adopted over the objections of moderates like Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir by 39 votes out of 66. But the idea sunk out of sight during the independence struggle, and Portuguese Timor received only passing attention thereafter." (p. 191) though some added they considered independence unrealistic because "the Timorese were more backward than the Australian aborigines". Whatever the case, it was agreed that the Government's use of force was short-sighted and no way to build a nation. Indonesia must find another way to deal with multi-culturalism.

Suggestions on the future of East Timor covered a wide spectrum of possibilities. A minority opted for independence and stressed the importance of properly coordinated international efforts to this end. The majority thought Indonesia had passed the point of no return and that independence was an impossible dream. In the view of one university professor, Fretilin, whose economic ideology is shared by progressive elements in Indonesia, should abandon the struggle for independence and collaborate with these elements to build a new Indonesia. The very most that could be expected might be some form of election in East Timor which resulted in its being granted some autonomy as a 'daerah istimewa' (special region). This might occur if the East Timor debacle was employed internally against Suharto as another illustration of the corruption and violence which has marked his administration. Other suggestions were that the Government should be pressed to compensate Timorese families for property losses; that Indonesians sympathetic to East Timor should be involved in overseas conferences on the subject; and that reports on human rights violations in Timor should be published in Indonesia.

Conclusion

It would be wrong to deduce from the above that East Timor has become a hot issue in Indonesia involving widespread soul-searching. There are significant pockets of concern, and their number has increased. However there is no public sharing of information, no open debate, no broad-based coalition of concern, and few, if any, signs that the coordination and stimulus necessary for these things to happen will materialise. East Timor is still off-limits. Furthermore, I formed the impression that at least in the vortex of Jakarta politics people are more preoccupied with problems closer to home than with those of far-away East Timor.

Nevertheless it can be concluded that East Timor is no longer a closely kept military secret in Indonesia; that the Government's alleged reasons for annexing Timor are no longer universally accepted; that there is a sense of distress, even anger, at what has transpired in East Timor especially amongst those who have been there; and finally there is a growing number of people who accept that East Timor is 'our responsibility' at least in the area of individual human rights.

Whether the East Timor issue will lead people to question the system, especially the pre-eminence of the military, or to form an active movement of dissidence, remains to be seen.

II The military/administrative situation in East Timor

The administration of East Timor is patterned on that of Indonesia itself. Its 13 kabupaten districts (which match the Portuguese concelhos) are headed by bupatis and sub-divided into some 64 kecamatan sub-districts headed by camats. These in turn are divided into desa headed by kepala desa. The respective office-bearers are, in the main, Timorese. The enclave of Oecussi in West Timor is administered separately and not from Kupang as might be expected.

Despite the smallness of the territory and its severely reduced and debilitated population, however, the Indonesian military is more intensely present than in Indonesia itself. Some informants hesitated to estimate the number of troops arguing that the constant turnover made an accurate assessment impossible. Others, all of them recent visitors, put the number at approximately 30.000. Though both are present, no-one was able to say how many of these were territorial troops and how many were combat units (pasukan). This military force is supplemented by a large force of Timorese militia or Hansip (civil defence), readily distinguishable by their long hair from the Indonesian military who favour clipped moustaches.

Hansip have a reputation for brutality. A Catholic priest suggested they demonstrate their loyalties to Indonesia by being over-zealous, a role they have been blackmailed into because they are suspected of former Fretilin sympathies. It is also possible that some Hansip act this way because they are former enemies of Fretilin. Whatever the case, it seems Indonesia has employed the 'divide and rule' tactic with some success, cleverly exploiting old political and tribal divisions in both their use of Hansip and their organisation of the resettlement sites. The same tactic is also used in their administration in that members of one tribe are sometimes recruited to deal with problems affecting another tribe. Finally, vis-a-vis Hansip, it should be noted that according to a former army employee there is concern at high levels in the Indonesian army lest the several thousand Timorese troops who have been recruited, trained and equipped by Indonesia prove difficult to integrate into civilian life once they are eventually de-mobbed.

The power of the civilian administration is largely nominal for real and ultimate authority is vested in the army officers who occupy positions matching those of their civilian opposites. The effective rulers of East Timor are three Indonesian colonels: Colonel Kalangi (Overall commander; a Catholic; easy-going and keen on telling jokes; one aid official who met him said he did not ask about aid plans and needs but only how much money this official had because he was setting up a Bali Bar in Balide - a better-off suburb of Dili; in the opinion of this aid official, however, such a person was preferable to the more conscientious type who would be tough and strict); Colonel Sinaga (Secretary to the Governor, Protestant, anti-Catholic, conflicts with the Bishop); and Colonel Rajagukguk (Regimental Commander, Protestant). Ultimate authority, of course, rests with better known military figures outside East Timor such as Dading Kalbuardi (Regional Commander, Bali), Benny Moerdani and Sudomo (Intelligence chiefs, Jakarta) - each of them closely involved with President Suharto in the West Irian campaign, and General Jusuf (Defence Minister and CIC of the Armed Forces) a regular visitor to East Timor who especially makes a point of celebrating important feasts such as Christmas and Idul Fitri with his troops presenting himself as their 'bapak' (father).

Several sources mentioned that the Indonesian army in East Timor is plagued with suspicions and tensions especially, but not only, between the territorial and pasukan troops. The same problem affects relations between the civilian and military apparatus. Army officers, for example, often do not bother to explain their decisions or interfere with decisions made by civilians, further frustrating this powerless group. One source told how the army had ordered badly needed rice seed sent back to Java. One Timorese official contrasted the Portuguese and Indonesian administrative styles comparing the relative sensitivity of the Portuguese with the pushiness of the Indonesians who make no allowance for the psychological condition of the people.

Though some officers think the civilians should be given more scope, the military generally believe the security and civil situation demands their continuing heightened presence on the dwi-fungsi (dual function) basis. The military, it is argued, must supply the man-power and expertise not otherwise available in East Timor either from the reduced ranks of the Timorese elite or from Indonesian civilians, who are reluctant to work there - for personal, monetary, social, security and geographical reasons. It is also possible the army has a vested interest in staying in East Timor. Whether this is for military reasons, for example, training etc., or because of the fruits of corruption still to be won or for some other reason, is not clear. However one source at the Australian Embassy reported speculation that the June 10 attack on Dili was in fact engineered by the army itself to demonstrate that the security situation still requires its large-scale presence in East Timor.

The weight of evidence, however, strongly suggests that the principal reason for the army's exaggerated presence in East Timor is the lack of security there. The army is not there primarily for developmental, technical or domestic defence purposes. Like any army its primary purpose is coercion. Integration has not been a peaceful process in East Timor. It has been forced on East Timor and until the army is confident integration will stick of itself it will not run the risks associated with premature withdrawal and civilianisation.

East Timor bears all the marks of an occupied country. Passage to and from East Timor is restricted to selected individuals and is closely controlled by Hankam and Intelligence. Outgoing mail is censored. Phone calls from Dili are monitored. The movements of the handful of foreign aid officials permitted in East Timor are restricted and controlled by the military whom the aid personnel label as "paranoic". The travel documents (surat jalan) of people - including Indonesian civilians - entering and leaving Dili are examined at fixed checkpoints. Long queues of travellers are asked what the Pancasila is, which party did you belong to, who are your friends, where are you going and for how long. In the words of one Indonesian "the Intelligence treat the people like dogs". Dili citizens must carry identity cards at all times. Various curfews apply in Dili. Intelligence personnel - many of them Chinese, especially those who can speak English and Portuguese, pose as taxi-drivers and restaurant waiters. People are afraid to speak openly. Penalties in the form of extra taxes and job dismissals continue to be imposed on those who refuse to take out Indonesian citizenship. People visiting Dili to obtain food may take away no more than 5 kilos of rice and 2 of sugar to ensure their return and that they do not have enough to pass on to Fretilin. Since the June 10 attack on Dili, a strip of land bordering the southern perimeter of Dili has been converted into a no-man's land as a security measure. Refugees squatting there have had to move within Dili proper. Arrests continue to be made without due process. Order without law is the norm, as one Indonesian put it. Eight kepala desa (village heads) in the eastern sector were arrested in the first half of 1980 on suspicion of association with Fretilin. Fretilin does in fact have many family connections with the population in this area. Several hundred people were arrested in Dili consequent on the June 10 assault. Some were released after representations were made by the ICRC. 98 were still in prison in mid August 1980.

The number of prisons and the number of prisoners and their conditions are difficult to establish with accuracy. One well-placed source believes there are at least three prisons: one at Comarca in Dili, two in the interior, and possibly a fourth on the island of Atauro off Dili. Others were more sure of Atauro's use as a prison stating that whereas previously it had served as a detention centre for the discipline of troublesome Indonesian troops, it was now used for Timorese, especially those suspected of involvement with Fretilin. Whilst there is no doubt the Sang Tai Ho shopping complex formerly served as a front for an Intelligence interrogation/detention centre, opinions on its current use varied with some maintaining part of it was still used by Intelligence and others asserting it was now used solely for commercial purposes.

Most informants (including one who was in Dili at the time and another who visited not long after) believed the June 10 attack on Dili was undertaken by Fretilin, probably with civilian support from within the capital. All the indications are that the Indonesian army took it as such. A tight curfew was imposed; General Dading Kalbuardi flew in from Bali; the army put on a display of strength; there were mass arrests, tighter security checks and the clearing of a security zone.

The attack yielded a big haul of arms which Fretilin forced some citizens to carry off into the bush. Forced out of hiding by hunger but too afraid to return to their homes, 3-4 of these civilians surrendered to the Bishop after several days. Both the Bishop and senior seminary staff pleaded for them with the Intelligence arguing they were people of good reputation who had no choice but to cooperate with Fretilin. To no avail. They were handed over to Hansip, taken to the old seminary of Dare behind Dili and shot on the volley ball court by Hansip. Local people living in the seminary precincts witnessed the executions. The bodies were tossed into a gully and could still be smelt many weeks later as fear prevented anyone from burying them. Those executed were prominent Dili Catholics.

Very little additional information on the guerilla resistance was available. Estimates of Fretilin numbers ranged from 300 to 1000. It was generally agreed they were concentrated in the eastern sector, though not confined there. In addition to the June 10 attack, small groups of Fretilin are occasionally encountered in the Dili area. The men in these groups were described as being dirty and long-haired but, though looking for food, respectful in their attitude, strong and armed. The director of the CRS program, Frank Carlin, described the guerillas as dedicated commandos who worked in small groups, were very mobile and in good condition. Another source spoke of aid being passed on to Fretilin by sympathetic kepala desa. It was reported they use ammunition sparingly: "one shot, one head" as an Indonesian expressed it. Whilst the army conducts some search and destroy missions, it would appear the principal Indonesian strategy is concentrated on maintaining the status quo, i.e. defending what is already under Indonesian control and containing Fretilin in the isolated interior. One source, however, quoting military sources in Dili and BAKIN in Jakarta, was convinced the military was planning a major final offensive against Fretilin and would move in a large number of fresh combat battalions for this purpose - possibly towards the end of 1980.

Perhaps the key element in the Indonesian administrative/military strategy, however, has been the relocation of the bulk of the population in the so-called 'resettlement sites'. This major restructuring of Timorese society has taken three forms:

i. some displaced people have joined old established villages instead of returning to their former areas;
ii. there has been a re-grouping of the population in larger groups (the words 'agglomerations', 'concentrations', 'enclaves' were also used) around centres in which administrative services are concentrated, instead of a return to the old pattern of hundreds of small dispersed settlements;
iii. new sites have been constructed.

Brigadier-General Saronto of the Indonesian Red Cross (Palang Merah Indonesia) argued this re-arrangement had been carried out primarily for the social and economic benefit of people from the mountains. According to the Brigadier the semi-nomadic, slash and burn, decentralised pattern of the past had been ecologically, educationally and economically harmful. The centralised re-grouping would make the provision of services, literacy, fertile land, and economic development easier. Secondly, it was argued, the resettlment program would reverse the colonial pattern of divide and rule pursued by the Portuguese and by forcing groups to live together would reduce the tribal conflicts which had been mainly responsible for the war in East Timor.

In contrast, everyone else, including church and aid officials, conceded the basic purpose of the sites was military and that developmental considerations were secondary. One Golkar adviser stated frankly that the sites were a counter-insurgency measure patterned on the practice of Thompson in Malaya and General Taylor in Vietnam whose purpose was to indoctrinate the people and isolate them from the guerillas. A CRS official in New York twisted the point to Indonesia's good account stating that the people had been relocated "for their own safety from the terrorists".

There was also general agreement that the sites represented a significant departure from the familiar lifestyle of the people and that those sites from which the people were not allowed to move were, in the words of an Indonesian churchman, "little better than prisons". The people are not happy in them. Water supply is a problem. Large tracts of cultivatable land are not being exploited. ICRC believes the sites are to be permanent. Indonesian church officials believe they will only remain in place until the army is confident it has total security. Some people have been allowed return to villages where security permits. Bobh Indonesian and Timorese clergy believe the people should be allowed leave the sites and the latter are trying to persuade the army to allow a few families to leave at a time. CRS in New York also does not favour the permanency of the sites, underlining the widespread negative assessment of their value. CRS, according to its New York planning officer John Donnelly, would prefer to finance the people's return to their land rather than the development of the sites. **

*** This general assessment is shared by Donald Weatherbee of the University of South Carolina. Reporting on his visit to East Timor, May 30-June 4, 80 Weatherbee comments: "A new, structural problem exists inhibiting agricultural development in East Timor... The restrictions imposed on access to land away from the centers means that the larger populations have to be supported on less land... Flying over East Timor by helicopter, one is impressed by the thousands of acres of fields - for corn, dry rice etc...- now going back to waste... the policy of denying land to the population may have to be rethought... (lest it) prove to be both economically and politically counterproductive." pp. 19-22 passim.*

An incident related by a CRS official in Jakarta well illustrates that army thinking is not primarily developmental. One village south of Manatuto had already been relocated twice because of low crop yield. The CRS man was on the spot when the local military commander said, waving his hand, that he would shift the camp again to a spot higher up. When the CRS official tentatively suggested ("one does not presume to advise the military") that a soil sample be taken first, the commander arbitrarily dismissed the idea as irrelevant.

Such purely military thinking does not square with Thompson's full thesis on strategic hamlets, on which the resettlement sites are modelled. Thompson stresses the strategic centre is to be a focus of development, attractiveto the people because of its intrinsic benefits, and a superior alternative to anything experienced by the people under the old order or offered by the resistance. In his view the centre is not solely a means of control and coercion.

Though the army has made security and pacification its priorities, at the expense of development, there have been attempts,other than those already mentioned, to bring its approach into line with this Thompson philosophy. A 12 page memorandum prepared within Golkar early in 1980 and directed to Hankam urges what it calls a program of "strategic preventive counter-insurgency" in East Timor. According to this memorandum, positive development at all levels of Timorese life must form the centre of this program because "the social and material cost of a preventative program is always cheaper than repressive measures. The urge to embrace must exceed the urge to strike". Such an approach, in the view of the memorandum, will also serve other purposes. The Western press, always ready to exaggerate events in East Timor (e.g. the Peter Rodgers report on the 1979 famine) will be quietened as will Fretilin and its supporters abroad. Further it will dispel motives to oppose or rebel against Indonesia on the part of a people who have already suffered severe colonial under-development under Portugal. Only the development of East Timor will achieve that sense of belonging (rasa senasib-sepenanggungan) to Indonesia which is missing from the relationship, making the problems of integrating East Timor different from West Irian where the relationship already enjoyed a shared history and mutual sense of community. Emphasis on the development of Timor, provided it is carried out as part of a broad program of regional development, is completely compatible with the objectives of Repelita III. Finally, the memorandum notes that Hankam and BAKIN should be responsible for the program it urges because "besides having the skills required, they can also work in a non-formal and behind-the-scenes (terselubung) way".

Conclusion

Though the facade of a Timorese civilian administration has been erected, it is the Indonesian military, present in very large numbers, which rules East Timor - with a heavy hand.

The military's priorities are security and pacification, not development. This is partly the military way of doing things but mainly because active and passive resistance to integration continues.

As a result life is far from normal and East Timor bears all the marks of an occupied country. A wide range of checks and controls are rigorously imposed, including the enforced resettlement of the bulk of the population in centres. Despite claims to the contrary, these centres are essentially anti-developmental.

The civilian administration is frustrated and efforts to make development and civilianisation the priorities continue to be largely ignored.

III The churches and East Timor

(a) The Catholic Church in East Timor

The influence of the Catholic Church amongst the people, always considerable under Portugal, has increased as a direct consequence of the Indonesian invasion.

Though the divisions within the Church over the political future of East

Timor evident in 1975, continue, the main line is one of resistance to both political and ecclesiastical integration with Indonesia. The head of the Church in East Timor, Mgr da Costa Lopes, is the chief exponent of this position. Not only is he clearly on the record as favouring a genuine plebiscite of the people's wishes, he also refuses to formally integrate the Church of East Timor with the Indonesian Catholic Church.

Indonesia is thus faced with the anomaly of the major non-government organisation in its 27th province witholding its support for integration. This is a source of conflict between the two and has sharply increased the difficulty for Indonesia of winning the hearts and minds of an already heavily alienated population.

Mgr da Costa Lopes, however, has relaxed his earlier hard-line policy of non-cooperation with the Indonesian Church. He now attends Indonesian Bishop's Conferences as an observer and has accepted the services of a small number of Indonesian religious order personnel in the areas of health, aid and education. The Vatican has warned the Indonesian Bishops Conference not to interfere.

Mgr da Costa Lopes was Diocesan Vicar-General under Bishop Riberu until a break-down forced the latter to retire to his homeland, Portugal, leaving the Monsignor in charge as Apostolic Administrator of the diocese. Though he prefers to called 'Bishop', he has not been formally consecrated Bishop by the Vatican which has assumed direct control over the affairs of the Dili diocese. The Vatican works through its Papal Nuncio in Jakarta, Mgr Pablo Puente, a Spaniard, who took up his appointment in July 1980.

Da Costa Lopes' Vicar-General is Mgr A. Ricardo. Both men are highly respected and considered by all I spoke to as the best available. The only criticism I heard of the Bishop came from an Indonesian army chaplain who took exception to what he saw as the Bishop's high life-style and unfavourably compared the hierarchical style of the Dili diocese with the more progressive Indonesian church. Physically formidable and wily in character, the Bishop is outspoken before the military in defence of his people and human rights. One initiative to replace him with an Indonesian priest was dropped when it was realised the Indonesian substitute would not be acceptable, qua Indonesian, to the people. Fr Antonio Maia, a Timorese favoured by Colonel Sinaga to become bishop, was accidentally killed at an early age. Others have suggested that someone from Europe who knows Indonesia should be appointed. The director of the CRS program in East Timor, Frank Carlin, considered da Costa Lopes would not be made Bishop because the former Vatican Nuncio, Archbishop Farano (now in Latin America) "had a kill-file on him".

The diocese of Dili is staffed as follows:

- * 32 priests (of whom 25 are diocesan priests - comprising 2 missionaries from Portugal, 6 missionaries from Goa, and 17 Timorese; and 7 are Order priests - comprising 2 Jesuits from Portugal, 2 Salesians from Portugal, 2 Salesians from Italy, and 1 Salesian from Spain).

  Two Indonesian priests also work in East Timor: Fr Edmundus Nahak from West Timor (Dector of Catholic Education) and Fr Wabe from Manado (Army chaplain).

- * 5 brothers (comprising 1 Salesian deacon from Portugal, 2 Salesian brothers from Italy and Portugal, 1 Jesuit scholastic from Indonesia).

- * 33 sisters (comprising 20 Canossians of whom 14 are Timorese and 6 Italian, 9 Carmelites from Spain (and 6 Timorese novices), 1 Dominican from Timor, and 3 sisters of St Charles Borromeus from Indonesia).

These people work in parishes, education and health.
Some 150 Catholic teachers from Atambua have also been recruited.
The diocese is divided into 3 parishes (each with 6 outstations) and 16 quasi-parishes with 72 outstations.
The Canossian sisters (whose order has been in East Timor for 100 years) now belong to the Australian Province of the Order (headquarters in Brisbane). The Salesians belong to the Philippino province of their order. The HQ of both are in Rome.

The church is badly under-staffed and its personnel, who are distributed throughout East Timor, are over-worked. There is a serious need for rest breaks and refresher courses. The Los Palos area is worst off: one 75 year old Spanish Salesian priest and one Portuguese Salesian brother are responsible for an area of 3200 sq kms and 30.000 people (75% animist). Five languages are spoken in the area: Tetun, Makasai, Makalen, Soanu and Fataluku.

The church has a strong influence over the people. As a report prepared (July 80) for the Indonesian church put it: "The people are more receptive to the priests and religious than they are to the government... this is a source of conflict between the two". The report goes on to comment that relations between Church and State are now totally different to what they were before 1975 when the church and the government were united in their approach. Now "the Indonesian government controls the people by force; the people do not respond freely and voluntarily and look to the Church as their only salvation".

Though there has been an overall decline in the population of the order of 200.000, the proportion of Catholics has risen from 30% pre-1975 to more than 50%. Antagonism towards Indonesia, survival, and pressure from the Indonesian military who, acting on the pancasila which requires belief in God, have required people to declare their religion, are responsible for this. Some have converted to Islam and Protestantism to reap the financial rewards offered and to ensure food supplies, but these rice Muslims and Protestants comprise only a tiny minority. The search for security has led many who have come down from the mountains to actually build their huts on church grounds. Further, enrolment at church schools far exceeds that at government schools.

The reference to Church-State relations before 1975 is, nevertheless, an important reminder that the days when the church enjoyed many priveleges as a 'department' of the Portuguese government, have gone. The church feels disadvantaged by the new situation and threatened by Islam and is consequently more assertive in its struggle for survival. Transmigration is feared for not only might it mean the expropriation of now vacant land and the marginalisation of the Timorese, but it will also mean Islamisation. Thus the church has been quick to rebuild its education system, bringing in Catholic teachers from the neighbouring diocese of Atambua, and to enrol the many animists seeking the security of belonging to the church, baptising them after the briefest possible period of preparation.

The Church in East Timor has not always responded well to the enormous challenges presented by the sudden breakdown of the colonial system (of which it was a part) and the staggering human needs thrust on it in recent years. Requests from some Timorese clergy for help in rebuilding churches and replenishing stocks of rosary beads have been met with a reminder from the Indonesian church that it cannot serve as the new paymaster of the East Timor church and that their social responsibilities are more important than pious devotions. Nevertheless the humanitarian services provided by the East Timor church have been generally, sometimes strikingly, effective and Indonesian church officials, who have channelled aid through the church in Dili since 1977, expressed complete confidence in the growing capacities of their sister church in the time ahead.

Antipathy to Indonesia is not only directed at the Indonesian army by the Timorese. It is also directed at Indonesian church personnel and felt, e.g. by the indigenous Sisters towards their Indonesian counterparts working in East Timor. As one Indonesian church worker reported: "Non-military Indonesians are also perceived as associates of the army (which is seen by the people to be composed) of cruel people devoid of love and morality". This same person changed his name because the Timorese do not like his Javanese name. They are reluctant to talk to him for fear he might pass on information. They particularly avoided him when he made the mistake of wearing calf-length boots which the people associated with military uniform.

Knowledgeable Indonesians I spoke with were frank in their perceptions of Timorese attitudes, as the following quotes demonstrate:

"Generally speaking the indigenous Timorese are negative towards Indonesians, especially Javanese. Their experience of suffering during five years ofwar has generated an anti-Indonesian army attitude".

"Their problems are not just economic problems. This is clear from the fact that many would prefer to die rather than live dependent on, and humiliated by, people of another nationality."

"Many have disappeared, goods have been looted, and buildings owned by the church and the people burnt. Everyone knows that very well. They've seen the killings and the oppression... The people cannot agree with this, and according to a Timorese priest, all the people are 'Fretilin' in this attitude".

"Army attempts to enrich themselves at the expense of the people are very conspicuous and the people are beginning to realise that this contradicts the whole Pancasila in which they are being indoctrinated... even the children are starting to realise this. The people feel they are occupied by the Indonesian army."

"The government is almost incapable of appreciating that many of the human values of the Pancasila are already possessed by the Timorese".

"Integration means: submit to the Government and do whatever is necessary to ensure this submission. This is not dialogue".

"The army is incapable of understanding the process of integration of the people. The army is obsessed by the doctrine of security".

An Indonesian Catholic priest reported the following points made by four Timorese youth during a discussion with him in March 1980 on the socio-economic situation in East Timor:

" * the people feel distressed because of the continual coercion and oppression; they are not free like they were five years ago. Many are nervous (gelisah) because many, especially the clever, disappear or are imprisoned for no clear reason.
 * aid from abroad in the form of food, medicine and so on is not reaching the people.
 * garden produce, especially coffee, is bought at cheap rates by senior people in the army; the people are not free to sell it elsewhere at fair prices.
 * the people are panic-stricken to hear, indeed witness, political prisoners cruelly tortured without the least bit of humanity.
 * we fear that 200.000 transmigrants will be sent to Timor. The Timorese numbered over 600.000 but because of the war and its consequences over five years the numbers still alive only number about 300.000. Of this 300.000 about 150.000 are vulnerable because many are sick and will die of hunger and lack of care. If the Indonesian Government brings many transmigrants to Timor, the Timorese people could disappear from the face of the earth. To do this would be a crime on the part of the Government.
 * the Catholic Church in East Timor depends on the Vatican. What is the attitude of the Catholic Church to the Church in East Timor and the situation of the people?
 * is the Catholic Church in Indonesia willing and able to help the Church and people of East Timor defend truth and justice?
 * what is the decision of the Minister for Religion regarding foreign missionaries working in East Timor?"

Vatican and East Timor

(b) The Vatican and East Timor

From discussion in New York, Rome and Jakarta I was able to learn in part the answers to the second and third last questions asked by these young people.

The Vatican's permanent observer to the United Nations in New York is Mgr Ettore di Filippo. His brief on East Timor is a passive one: to observe, listen and report back. He passes on UN decisions and testimonies, and reports on private meetings such as the one he had with two Timorese priests late in 1979. Though there is scope for his active intervention in UN deliberations - as, for example, in its scheduled assembly on the aged, he has not intervened on the question of East Timor or taken initiatives to advise the Vatican on policy-making.

Vatican policy, he says, is to leave action on local political matters to the Episcopal Conference of the country concerned and not to intervene unless invited. Why East Timor apparently has not been the subject of Vatican activity, given the Vatican's direct responsibility for the Church there, was not explained.

The diplomat agreed that East Timor has a right to self-determination. He understood the guerilla activity there. He surmised the people were being kept half-starved and confused to lessen their resistance. He agreed to draw the Vatican's attention to the Pope's reference to East Timor on American TV in June 1980. Appealing to Americans to support the work of CRS around the world Pope John Paul II had praised the work of CRS for the "drought-stricken victims of East Timor".

However, in view of the reality of Indonesia's presence in East Timor, an absolute commitment Indonesia would not be budged from, the only course was to work for the preservation of East Timor's culture, said the Monsignor. Only if East Timor maintained its semi-autonomous identity could it make what he saw as its future contribution to the Muslim environment around it. An essential factor in this is the freedom of the Church in East Timor to survive and develop. The Vatican has a special role to this end. Success on this level would ensure that East Timor played in the Indonesian region a civilising role analogous to that played by colonised Greece in ancient Rome and modern Israel in the Middle East.

Advisors to Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican Secretary of State and a consummate diplomat, informed me in Rome that the Vatican privately regards East Timor as an occupied country in which there has been no genuine act of self-determination. The Vatican does not accept East Timor is part of Indonesia and will not until this has clearly been demonstrated as the will of the people and/or the United Nations. This policy position has been communicated to the Indonesian Government through diplomatic channels as have Vatican concerns about the Church in East Timor and human rights. However, the Vatican accepts the Indonesian annexation of East Timor as a fait accompli. Though it has received direct communications from the Bishop of Dili, who it acknowledges is a nationalist, it deals with the Church there through its representative in Jakarta.

This man, Mgr Pablo Puente, I found singularly unhelpful. Most of my queries were met with knowing smiles and the explanation that he had been in Jakarta only one month and had not been to East Timor. However he understood the situation in East Timor was much better now than it had been under Portugal - notably in the medical field. We must be realistic and accept the fact of Indonesia's presence. More aid is required but the chances of getting it there are virtually nil if politics and humanitarian concerns are mixed. He is powerless to do anything about family reunions. Further representations should be made through the Australian Episcopal Conference or the Vatican.
The diplomat's assistance, Mgr Fontana, who is reputed to be on good terms with General Benny Moerdani, a Catholic, was absent on leave.

(c) The Indonesian Catholic Church and East Timor

Several references have already been made on this matter elsewhere in this report. A senior Indonesian Jesuit summed up the general attitude of the Indonesian Church to East Timor as follows: being very conscious that it forms a small minority in Indonesia, the Church safeguards its position by opting for a genuine pancasila based on human development, justice etc. in the spirit of the Gospel. It has no capacity to protest in a manifest way various injustices in Indonesia so it cannot reject, correct or change the Indonesian government's policy on East Timor. Thus while nationally and internationally the Indonesian church is prepared to help the Church in Timor it "cannot help it in the way a large part of the Timorese people would like, namely to win freedom from Indonesia and become an autonomous Timorese State".

Its special role is to serve the people and Church of Timor in the area of human development. Even this is not 100% acceptable to the Indonesian government as even attempts in Indonesia itself to improve the lot of the 75% who are poor, are suspect. Despite the difficulties involved, however, the Church must be involved in the broad process of human development and not restrict its services to the purely spiritual.

A paper presented to a gathering of Indonesian church leaders in July 1980 stresses repeatedly that Indonesian Church attitudes to the Church in East Timor must be clearly based on respect and a spirit of detached service. The approach of the Church must be different to that of the army. The Timorese, the paper continues, will not tolerate attitudes of superiority or attempts to Indonesianise their Church. Indonesian Church people must completely abandon any intention of amalgamating the Timorese church with the Indonesian church or its structures. On the contrary, Indonesian church people must, by learning Tetum etc., inculturate themselves deeply in the Timorese milieu, identify with the people and work to develop an autonomous Timorese church. They must not allow themselves to be used by the government for crude integration purposes and must support the Timorese church when it needs to speak up. The Timorese church needs the services of people from other countries as well as Indonesia. The paper also repeatedly stresses that growth is a process which cannot be forced or hurried.

(d) The Protestant Churches and East Timor

Whatever the private opinions of some individuals within its ranks, the DGI (Indonesian Council of Churches) as an organisation has solidly backed the Indonesian Government line on East Timor throughout the conflict.

The following summary of DGI reports issued in 1980 clearly bears this out: **

- the Western press has exaggerated and distorted events in East Timor;
- the problems of East Timor must be solved by Indonesians;
- aid to East Timor, though originating from abroad, must come from the Indonesian side;
- Fretilin are terrorists and guilty of numerous atrocities;
- Fretilin are responsible for the "malnutrition and suffering" of 1979-80 because they forced the people to live in the interior for three years;
- the death-toll has been minimal. The population of East Timor in 1979 was 592.603 compared to a figure of 653.211 in 1975. *** Most of the of the 60.000 who are missing are still alive having fled overseas or into West Timor.
- "safety" is good with Fretilin terror groups confined to the Eastern end;
- harvests in East Timor have been so successful,the numbers needing aid have dropped dramatically;
- the situation was "normalised" in 1978-1979;
- the resettlement sites have been set up by the Indonesian Government as relief and welfare measures;
- transmigration to East Timor from West Timor and the Moluccas should be undertaken.

Enough has been reported elsewhere in this paper to show up the falsity and highly contentious nature of these claims. However it should be noted that the DGI efforts to play down the seriousness of the humanitarian problem in East Timor involve it in self-contradiction for elsewhere the reports identify the following problem areas which, of course, form the basis of its East Timor programs and its appeals for overseas funding:

**
The reports are: Minutes of the Meeting of the Indonesia Australia Mission Group, 17-21 March 1980, Jakarta; Report on visit to East Timor (17.12.79 - 24.12.79) by Dr Herman Pooroe and covering letter; East Timor Rehabilitation and Development Program, April 1980 by Dr Herman Pooroe.

***
This figure is one of the several advanced by the Indonesian Government/military in 1979. It was supplied by the Indonesian military commander in Timor in December 1979. Two months earlier in October, official Indonesian figures put the population at 522,433. Most Timorese incline to an even lower figure. For an examination of this whole question, see East Timor: How Many People Have Died? , ACFOA Development Dossier I, May 1980 pp 22.24.

- there are 30.000 widows in East Timor;
- there are many orphans;
- many have died because of war and illness and starvation in the forests over three years;
- much of the people's land has been destroyed or taken away;
- urgent programs are needed for widows and orphans, and in the areas of agriculture, health and basic job skills;
- hunting possibilities are limited;
- the rural population is educationally, socially and (especially) economically backward;
- clothes for children are desperately required.

This unashamed pro-Government stance and conspicuous failure to protest abuses of human rights has resulted in some conflict within the international Protestant community where some elements have felt obligated to stress the rights of the Timorese and condemn the actions of the Indonesian Government. DGI reactions were at first defensive claiming that East Timor was an internal affair of the Indonesian people and no business of the international community. Tensions were high between the DGI and various national bodies such as the Australian Council of Churches and the WCC (World Council of Churches). More recently, the DGI has adopted a more positive strategy of attempting to co-opt international Protestant assistance for its aid programs in East Timor, attempting (without success) to win access to East Timor for overseas Church leader delegations, and pleading ignorance when challenged on the specific situation in East Timor. It has also agreed, along with MAWI (the Indonesian Bishops Conference) and the ACC, to pursue the question of the reunion of Timorese families. It claims its attempts to get Government action on this matter have been sabotaged by anti-Indonesian reports in the Australian press.

Concrete activity on East Timor by the DGI has been restricted to the three areas of family reunions, its own aid program and the building of a new Protestant community there. The latter two, which have received most emphasis, also clearly demonstrate its close cooperation with the Indonesian Government/Military.

Using some US$40.000 worth of funds contributed by CICARWS (WCC) and the ACC, the DGI made corn seed and vitamin enriched food available to East Timor late in 1979. (Strangely, some food given to the military to distribute on behalf of the DGI was returned to the DGI in Jakarta). Its formal aid program, however, was not launched until early 1980 after survey visits had been made to East Timor by the DGI's development officers. The two-part program is directed at emergency relief and rehabilitation services.

The latter is intended to provide assistance to 200 widows and 200 orphans selected by the Protestant congregations in Dili and Baucau; to provide basic training in carpentry and sewing to landless peasants in Dili, Baucau, Los Palos and Batugade; to provide agricultural training at the Protestant Rural Training Centre outside Kupang for 20 selected cadres from various parts of East Timor; to provide health training for five East Timorese at institutions in Java. Six DGI motivators (community organisers) were sent to East Timor to facilitate these projects. The security crackdown after June 1980 confined these motivators to Dili and forced the DGI to revise these plans.

DGI reports make it clear these programs are to be undertaken in close cooperation with the Government/Military in East Timor. These reports also stress the urgency of starting the programs "in order that the people of East Timor have a sense of belonging to the overall Indonesian community and that the presence of the Church can be felt".

To encourage the support of the East Timorese and increase its fund raising potential abroad, the DGI in January 1980 initiated a joint East Timor program committee with MAWI (Indonesian Bishops Conference). The plan and an agreement to cooperate with the Government/Military were put to Sudomo of Kopkamtib (a Protestant) at a meeting organised by the DGI to which MAWI representatives were invited. Endorsement was given by the Military Security Division in charge of the co-ordination of development and security in East Timor.

The joint committee, known as Karya Kasih (Work of Love) has representatives in both Jakarta and East Timor.

Its Jakarta members are:

DGI

Directors

Dr S.A.E. Nababan (General Secretary DGI)
Dr Wirakotan (Secretary to Nababan)
Rev Ardi Soejatno (Secretary for Unity and Witness, DGI)

Executive

Dr W. Lalisang (Secretary, Development Centre, DGI)
Dr Herman Pooroe (Secretary, Commission for Service and Development, DGI)
Mr Martin Assa
Mr Boy Manumpil
Ms Imalia Komalo
Mr Gustave Dupe

MAWI

Directors

Mgr Leo Sukoto (Archbishop, Jakarta)
Drs Frans Seda (Atma Jaya Uni, former Finance Minister in the Suharto Government, strongly pro-integration)
Fr Zegwaard (Director of LPPS, MAWI)

Executive

Fr Hadiwikarta
Fr Hardoputranto (Education Officer, MAWI)
Ms Imakulata (LPPS)
Dr Himawan (assistant to Frans Seda, pro-integration)
Mr Harsidi

Its Dili members are:

Sr Lucia Sumarin (Order of Charles Borromeus, Indonesian, acting head)
Rev May Bengnu (Indonesian)
Mr Purwoto (Indonesian)
Fr Ricardo (Vicar General Dili Diocese)
Representative of the Protestant Hosana Church, Dili)
Mrs Siminens (Indonesian)
Representative of the Protestant Jemaat Allah Church, Dili).

Karya Kasih, in fact, is not functioning and the DGI and MAWI continue to operate separate aid programs. The Karya Kasih initiative has not been welcomed by the Timorese Catholic Church which broadly identifies Protestants with the army and government and is not ecumenically disposed. Secondly, elements within Karya Kasih are highly critical of its integrationist objectives and its declared commitment to close cooperation with the Indonesian Government/Military. MAWI, in particular, is concerned to respect the independence of the Catholic Church in East Timor which has chosen not to integrate with the Indonesian Catholic Church. Others think MAWI should be pressuring the Timor Church to integrate.

The DGI is also actively promoting a new Protestant Church in East Timor. In sharp contrast to the pre-1975 situation when it had only a toehold in the Catholic dominated Portuguese colony, the Protestant Church has developed rapidly since the Indonesian annexation and now has 5000 members in 11 centres, coordinated by a Protestant minister from West Timor. These centres are: Dili, Aleu, Same, Maliana, Batugade, Bobonaro, Viqueque, Baruma, Laga, Los Palos, and Leteicko. The Protestant Church in Dili is divided with Gereja Hosana, where the assistant minister is a Protestant army chaplain, catering mainly for government officials and members of the armed forces, including the military commander, and the old Gereja Jemaat Allah serving mainly Timorese.

First contacts with East Timor were made in West Timor in 1975 when a Protestant congregation was begun composed of newly baptised converts from amongst East Timorese refugees. The Indonesian army considerably facilitated the rapid expansion which followed. According to the DGI, the military apparatus is engaged in what the DGI terms another mission, viz evangelisation. Some 5000 people have been baptised by Indonesian army chaplains. At least some of these people have been paid money for joining and the evangelisation process has been superficial, involving, in the words of one Indonesian, "just pouring the water".

In addition, a new Church, vicarage and multi-purpose hall are being constructed in Dili with help from the DGI and especially local Protestant army officers and government officials. Another new Church and vicarage have been constructed at Baruma (Baucau) with the aid of Zipur (technical team of the army), the members of Battalion 126 (a Protestant battalion from North Sumatra), and the local congregation.

There is speculation in some overseas Protestant Church quarters that the army is using the Protestant Church to drive a wedge between the people and the Catholic Church whose cooperation the army has failed to win. Whatever the case, there is little doubt the DGI is committed to a policy of integration in the name of Indonesian unity- though it would perhaps prefer to label this policy one of reconciliation. The establishment of a training centre in West Timor near the East Timor border to train ministers for East Timor (East Timorese recruits for which the army insists on selecting), and DGI plans to introduce Protestant educators to East Timor from Kisar (Moluccas) and West Timor, will further this process.

In view of all this, it is hardly surprising that DGI requests for funds for its East Timor program directed to the WCC and various national Councils of Churches, have met with a mixed reception.

Some, such as the US National Council of Churches in New York, the British Council of Churches (Christian Aid), and the West German agency Bread for the World, have readily made funds available without asking further questions.

Within the WCC, while there is general agreement that it should work on a number of fronts in relation to East Timor, including political activity, concrete action has been limited to aid support in recent years. The WCC initially encouraged the DGI to get involved in emergency aid, and cooperated when requests were received from the DGI for funds. When challenged on the propriety of its support, however, the WCC decided to adopt a "go slow" policy but stopped short of cancelling its involvment.

It is widely held in international Protestant circles that the DGI complex about its weakness in Indonesia had made it too close to the Indonesian Government which it feels it must cooperate with if it is to improve its position. Nevertheless its position as a third world church, confronted by the twin challenges of poverty and Islam, does give it a special leverage within the WCC. It would appear that nothing short of a direct dialogue between a particular national Council of Churches and the DGI will produce a re-think on the part of the DGI.

It is within the Dutch Council of Churches that the debate over the nature of the DGI involvement in East Timor has been most vigorously conducted. ICCO (the Dutch inter-church aid body) at first rejected the DGI request for funds mainly on the grounds that the DGI was planning to cooperate with the army in East Timor. This decision was then reversed by senior members of ICCO, some of whom, as former missionaries in Indonesia, are strongly pro-Indonesian. The Indonesian Ambassador to Holland added his weight to this decision. The ICCO decision, it has been noted, is out of character with its general aid philosophy. Extremely discerning in aid decisions relating to Latin America, for example, it would appear to have a blind spot vis-a-vis Indonesia. This pro-Indonesia sentiment also manifests itself in other ways. A senior Dutch Church scholar, for example, has called on the Portuguese Catholic hierarchy to pressurise the East Timor Catholic Church to accept integration.

The revised ICCO decision was challenged publicly from within the Dutch Council of Churches in September 1980. A fresh review was undertaken leading to the suspension of support for the DGI program by some Dutch Protestant Churches, a decision by ICCO not to support any more such programs, and direct discussion with representatives of the DGI.

IV The economic/aid situation

The Biafra-like crisis of 1978-80 has passed. The precise death-toll and the long-term damage to countless minds and bodies may never be known. By and large, however, the food and medicine imported by the aid agencies has been reaching the people, lives have been saved and a measure of health restored. This has been largely the work of the international agencies, ICRC and CRS in particular.

Nevertheless the situation remains precarious. The economy has not been restored to working order (cf. section II), the people are not self-reliant, and were the agencies on whom the bulk of the population depend, to leave, the situation might very well regress to the catastrophic state first publicly identified by the foreign ambassadors who visited East Timor in September 1978.

Limited cultivation has been carried out (cf. p. 7) and the mediocre harvest returns have provided only temporary relief. Markets are functioning again in a number of centres but the marginal surplus from house gardens available for sale yields little in the way of cash return. Unemployment is widespread. Coffee and garden produce are bought cheaply by Chinese-administered army-controlled monopolies such as P.T. Denok (controlled by General Benny Moerdani), thereby denying the people access to other markets and better prices. Prices are higher than in Jakarta. Dili shops are well-stocked but few can afford to buy. Complaints about the cost of living are widespread. There are very few Timorese overseas not sending money back to East Timor to support relatives. Widows and orphans abound. Orphans number between 200 and 1000 in each district according to the Timorese clergy. One Indonesian spoke of children of all ages coming to primitive single-room schools, making teaching very difficult. Their parents are dead, so they attach themselves to the teachers. Enrolments at the junior seminary in Dili before 1975 were over 100. Of the 37 there now, 20 have parents missing.

The medical situation is still very serious. Malaria, TB etc. are widespread, and there is a shortage of trained personnel. Doctors attached to the army generally restrict themselves to the army. One aid official told of a village in the far eastern sector with serious medical problems. Though the army visited it each week, they never took medics.
The Indonesian government has a scheme to attract medical school graduates to the countryside and outlying islands. They are bonded for seven years if they stay in Jakarta, but for one year only if, for example, they go to East Timor. Nevertheless of the 13 graduates working in East Timor in August, few had any commitment to the people. Most stayed in Dili till they had worked off their bond, making only an occasional visit 15 kms or so outside the capital.

There are very few cattle, horses and buffalo though they once abounded in large numbers, e.g. in the fertile and beautiful Los Palos region. CRS has planned a cattle project though there are cultural problems associated with their distribution.

The Indonesian government claims to have spent US$75 million on development in East Timor since 1976 and to have budgeted a further US$37 million for the 1980-81 fiscal year. Much of it appears to have been spent, 'showcase style', on cosmetic improvements. Dili especially has benefited and boasts such new amenities as traffic lights, TV and a new airport terminal at Comoro. Irrigation and agricultural projects started by the Portuguese in the Maliana district have also been revived and advanced, though there is some question as to how much this is benefiting the Timorese economy.

The importance of education as a means of Indonesianisation has been recognised and much has been spent on the provision of schools and teachers. General agricultural development, however, despite its fundamental importance, has been neglected. The resettlement centre policy and the military's preoccupation with security are responsible for this.

A paper delivered to Indonesian Church leaders in July 1980 makes the following points on the economy of East Timor:

" * Already there are signs that large-scale projects will be exploited for large profits by those involved in corruption. Projects far beyond the capabilities of the people in terms of their ability to administer and control them, will require their services as workers and coolies and so corruption will further exploit them. A structure of poverty has been introduced by the army."

To the question "Can East Timor develop an autonomous economy?" the paper responds:

" * It could export coffee, sandalwood, corn, copra, cassava, horses, pigs, beef. All of this was done before 1975. Oil had also been discovered, it is said.

* Capital investment is required to develop a human and physical infrastructure - roads, bridges, agriculture, plantations, livestock, fishery. All of this should be top priority so that the people have enough to eat again based on their own efforts and their produce is not expropriated by merchants and others as, for example, in Java and Lampung.

* Human development will demand considerable finance which will create debts. It is preferable that the Timorese advance by their own efforts. It is not necessary to import people from other areas in Indonesia.

* It is not necessary for Timor to become a market for special imported goods, although this is already happening. Cottage and village industries are more important: soap, coconut oil, weaving, coffee, wood, cattle, pigs and so on.

* If these things are disregarded, the Timorese will certainly become mere coolies, a 100% contradiction of their deep desire to develop in an autonomous way. The resulting frustration will be dangerous.

* For example, primary school books which have been sent are contributing to a consumer spirit which will destroy their spirit of mutual cooperation.

* The advent of multinationals to exploit oil and mineral resources will have the same effect as in Irian Jaya - the indigenous people will be pushed aside as superflous.

* There are already signs that the development of genuine human resources will be very difficult. Investment capital is easy to find: it will come from overseas through Jakarta. The Timorese Government does not need it or should not take it without good reason, lest the people are further impoverished.

* An autonomous economy cannot be achieved now , as in other areas in Indonesia. The Indonesian government has chosen its direction and the Timorese are beginning to be conscious of what is happening. Their aspirations will be frustrated. The future of East Timor will resemble other areas in Indonesia. What is needed are Timorese and Indonesians who have the capacity and courage to struggle against the Government for responsible and wise reforms to avoid further impoverishment in Timor. Lay people must be formed in East Timor who can participate in this struggle, supported by the church."

Conclusion

East Timor is in transition. Needed relief programs will continue but are already giving way to limited development programs.

The question is: what sort of development, and for whom?

There are fears, and some evidence to support them, that a Jakarta-style, neo-colonial development will be imposed. East Timor will be exploited by outside elements and a dual economy will emerge which benefits an elite but frustrates and impoverishes the majority.

V CRS (Catholic Relief Services of the US Catholic Conference)

Reports on CRS activity in East Timor have been published elsewhere (e.g. ACFOA Development Dossier I, May 1980). The following will fill out the picture and provide some insight into CRS' perceptions of East Timor and its role there.

CRS involvement on the ground in East Timor began in October 1979. They hope to extend this until at least late 1981.

During a courtesy call made on Adam Malik (then Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs) in January 1979 by the Executive Director of CRS, Bishop Edwin Broderick, the latter agreed on the spot to an invitation for CRS to work in East Timor. The decision was announced in the Jakarta press the following day.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of this meeting, CRS officials deny that the agency's involvement with East Timor began at this point. According to CRS, first contacts with East Timorese seeking assistance were made in 1977 at a meeting in New York organised by Church World Service. Subsequently some CRS funds were channeled through the Indonesian Bishops Conference aid program for East Timor which began in 1977. CRS also claims to have on file a letter from the former Bishop of Dili, Mgr Riberu, requesting their assistance. According to CRS, the meeting with Adam Malik took place at CRS' initiative after it had become clear that the Indonesian government was prepared to relax its boycott on international agencies which had kept CRS and others out of the territory. CRS, its officials argue, was admitted because of its good reputation in Indonesia.

According to CRS officials, then, it is wrong to imply that CRS was acting solely in consort with the Indonesian government as its instrument. The permission of the Indonesian government was necessary but CRS also had the support of the East Timor church, the Indonesian Bishops Conference and the Vatican.

Whilst not denying some contact between the Church in East Timor and CRS, the Director of the Indonesian Bishops' aid program in Jakarta, Fr Zegwaard, alleges that normal protocols were breached in that neither he nor Vatican officials in Jakarta were consulted or informed about the Broderick-Malik meeting. (As a foreign Church body working in Indonesia, CRS is expected to collaborate closely with the local church). The charge d'affaires at the Papal Nunciature in Jakarta was reportedly "furious" to learn of the CRS unilateral agreement with the Indonesian government, and the CRS regional director had effectively turned down a MAWI (Indonesian Bishops' Conference) request for assistance for its Timor program only hours before CRS offered US$50.000 at the Malik meeting.

Neither did CRS consult the Washington-based United States Catholic Conference (USCC), of which it is a subsidiary. Embarassed by the news that CRS was to work in East Timor, the USCC Office of International Peace and Justice expressed its view to CRS that its involvement in East Timor would too closely identify CRS with the Indonesian Government and its subjugation of East Timor, and could be used by the Indonesian Government to legitimise its presence. The view was also put that controls over the CRS program in Timor appeared inadequate.

Once inside East Timor, CRS, in the words of one of its officers in Jakarta, found that "without exaggeration, the situation was like Biafra and the Thai camps".

The management of the multi-million CRS program was entrusted to the Director of the CRS Indonesia Program, Frank Carlin. Recruited in Vietnam, he has worked with CRS all his adult life, serving in East Pakistan, South Korea and Indonesia. He and his Korean wife have two children. Acquaintances describe him as intelligent and highly experienced, but given to activism rather than reflective questioning and therefore "open to being used". A Red Cross visitor noted the following slogan from the US marines on the wall of his Dili office: "When the going gets tough, the tough get going".

He immersed himself in the East Timor situation with characteristic energy. At considerable cost to his family and his health, he worked 16 hours a day, bunking down at the CRS office in Dili and concentrating exclusively on the distribution of food and medicine to the 240.000 people for whom CRS was responsible. The program was plagued with problems. Three CRS vessels were wrecked on the south coast of East Timor, two of them sunk. Aid was dumped in various parts of Timor before adequate distribution logistics were in place, allowing some expropriation by the Indonesian military. Records and accounts were neglected, creating problems for CRS auditors. The resources of the CRS Jakarta office were diverted to meet the Timor emergency, generating problems for the CRS Indonesia program. Carlin himself contracted malaria and hepatitis and had to spend most of 1980 recuperating, some of it on leave in the USA. Nevertheless, the tide of suffering was slowly turned.

Carlin was aware of the sensitivity of the CRS operation. He advised his

CRS counterpart in Lisbon when she wrote enquiring about the program, not to ask too many questions lest he got into trouble. Sympathetic to the plight of the East Timorese and aware from her own experience as a refugee of "what it is like for a country to be occupied", she replied to my criticisms of the CRS operation: "I know. You think we are shining the shoes of the Indonesians".

Frank Carlin's two associates work out of the third-floor office of CRS over the Gelael supermarket in Slipi, Jakarta, and take it turn about to work in East Timor. They are Frank Catania (ex-Peace Corps, a graduate in South-East Asian studies from Cornell, agriculturalist and Indonesian speaker) and R. Carter Smith (ex-Peace Corps and former CRS officer in Fiji).

Fears have been expressed in many quarters that because CRS had no personnel stationed fulltime in Timor and so few Americans were involved, the multi-million dollar program was wide open to exploitation by corruption prone Indonesians. Carlin and his CRS colleagues dispute this on a number of grounds. They maintain that instead of shuttling to and from Dili, CRS personnel could have been stationed in Timor if they had so wished. However poor communications between Dili and Jakarta, the need to communicate by telex with CRS in New York, and shortage of suitable accommodation in Dili where only two hotels were functional, ruled out such an arrangement. John Donnelly, a CRS spokesman at CRS' ultra-modern office tower in New York, went so far as to argue that facilities were so backward in Dili that CRS would not want to inflict living there on any American incase they were harmed by the experience - surely a reductio ad absurdum coming from an aid official professionally committed to work in the third world. Another CRS officer in Jakarta conceded, however, that while it was obviously necessary to have representatives in Jakarta, the logistics of the shuttle arrangement created problems because phone calls from Dili were monitored and each time a visit to Dili was required the frustrating process of obtaining fresh permissions from Hankam had to be endured. CRS also maintained that, though keen to keep wage bills at a minimum, more CRS personnel could have been employed on the East Timor program had they wanted them. This was not necessary, however, and extra personnel had never been requested, because it is CRS policy to depend mainly on local people and CRS had every confidence in the competence of their Indonesian personnel and those Timorese they had co-opted. One CRS official confided he was so impressed by the abilities of some 6 to 7 of their Timorese assistants that he had thought of ways to get them out of Timor.

All CRS workers in East Timor must wear a badge publicly identifying their position. While this device may well discourage any temptation to corruption on the part of its wearers, it was not made clear whether it has afforded much protection from others, especially the all-powerful military.

One could safely assume a priori that aid has been corrupted in East Timor, particularly in view of the virtual absence of external checks on the army in this closed and geographically inaccessible situation and because of the endemic culture of corruption operating at all levels in Indonesia. The degree of aid corruption, however, would seem to have been much greater before the international agencies began their work. An army supplies manager who regularly visited East Timor, informed me he had resigned his position because of the high level of corruption pre-1979. The Semarang based company, PT Denok, administered by Chinese on behalf of a number of Indonesian Generals - including General Benny Moerdani, continues to control much of the import-export merchandise, especially coffee. An army vessel which regularly travels to Singapore from Dili on army business, also trades with Vietnamese refugees on the island Indonesia has made available to them. According to Carter Smith, it is no secret in high places in Jakarta that some two billion rupiahs worth of aid given to the Indonesian Red Cross pre-1979 was sold in Jakarta. ** CRS themselves do not trust the military and, in anticipation of their possible departure in October 1980, were rushing to distribute remaining stocks of aid rather than leave the task to the army. Fears

---

** *The detailed ACFOA report* *Aid and East Timor* *released in July 1979 charged that thousands of East Timorese died because aid supplied to the army controlled Indonesian Red Cross failed to reach them owing to corruption.*

that large-scale business corruption will continue as the Indonesian government undertakes larger development projects in East Timor have been mentioned elsewhere in this report.

One can readily sympathise with the agencies working in such an environment and conscious of their enormous responsibilities to their suffering recipients. Indeed as far as the agencies themselves are concerned, there is no doubt that the ICRC and CRS programs have been relatively freer of corruption than the pre-1979 Indonesian Red Cross operation. The success of their programs by contrast with the deteriorating situation under the Indonesian Red Cross, vouches for that. The ICRC maintains that its tightly administered methods of distribution and its system of daily distribution are responsible. CRS may have been more vulnerable to corruption because apart from distributing to larger numbers of people in more centres, it has worked through government channels. Whatever the case, both ICRC and CRS have publicly admitted corruption has accounted for losses of between 5% and 15% of their allocations.

CRS officials argued they had no choice but to work in East Timor on Indonesian Government terms. This meant, in the words of a CRS official in New York, "going where the Indonesian Government wants it to go and doing what the Indonesian Government wants it to do". 80% of its aid has gone through the government infrastructure. The remaining 20% has gone through the local Church mainly in response to requests for assistance from priests. The US Government supplied most of the finance because, according to a CRS official in Jakarta, the amounts required were simply not available from CRS' own funds. Much of the food was bought by CRS in Surabaya where CRS worked closely with the Divine Word Fathers (SVD) who have good contacts. CRS was also able to assist the Church in East Timor by transporting some freight free of charge from Java to Timor. Frank Carlin did approach Fr Monteiro, the Goanese Social Delegate of the Dili diocese and coordinator of the local church aid program, suggesting the Church might also serve as an aid conduit, but Monteiro declined owing to pressure of work. Apart from these incidental Church contacts, however, the CRS operation has been essentially governmental in character, not a church to church service.

This government association has created many frustrations for CRS. "Paranoic" Hankam officers insist on accompanying CRS officials working in Timor. When CRS, in anticipation of winding up in October 1980, was rushing to distribute its remaining stockpiles of food, the usually available government trucks were in short supply, most of the operational vehicles having been detailed to work on a government project. Of the 74 trucks available to the government, only 23 were in working order, the rest having been consigned to a Dili junk yard after breaking down. Negotiations for CRS to continue after September 1980 were dragging on through countless meetings with the Indonesian officials involved indicating yes, but offering nothing further. The shortage of active doctors in East Timor prompted CRS to negotiate for extra doctors with the Health Department through Liem Bian Kie (alias Jusuf Wanandi) of CSIS and Sudomo. Eight had already been selected from a university by CRS and offered wages above those paid by the government, but still the Health Department stalled.

CRS collaboration with the Indonesian government has also had the effect of locking it into the Government position on Timor. CRS is generally defensive of the Indonesian government on Timor. Its public account of the recent history of East Timor has been that of the Indonesian government, ascribing the suffering to civil war and drought (an analysis which Pope John Paul II repeated in part during his eulogy of CRS on American television cf. p. 12 above). Don Crosson, the CRS official in New York responsible for the East Timor program, defended the Indonesian annexation of East Timor comparing it to India's takeover of Goa (a familiar Indonesian rationalisation) which, he protested, was not accompanied by any outcry comparable to that leveled at Indonesia. In fairness it should be added that Crosson's superior, Mgr Landi, corrected him reminding him that in the 1980's "the world was more sensitive to small entities being gobbled up by large entities". One's opinion as a US citizen must not be confused with CRS policy, added Landi. Another CRS official in New York spoke of communism in East Timor - another polemic much used by Indonesia. Even if there is nothing in the allegation that Russia is involved in East Timor, said this official, "the fact that its been said is enough to influence judgements around here". Others claimed respectively, in defence of Indonesia, that the situation of the East Timorese refugees in Lisbon was worse than East Timor itself; that Indonesia was embarassed at the development progress it has made in East Timor; that the reports on abuses of human rights had never been substantiated; and that the resettlement sites had been established to protect the people from the terrorists.

CRS is in a better position than most to know the facts about East Timor. Everyone I spoke to within CRS, with one exception, had either visited East Timor or worked directly on the East Timor program. Its distorted perceptions are the result of either wilful defence of Indonesia or a casualty of CRS' much vaunted a-politicism which has led it to concentrate exclusively on the supply of aid, turning a blind eye to all else. (I noted with interest, e.g. that CRS officials in New York took from me copies only of the one or two paragraphs relating to CRS from the many pages of testimony presented to the June 1980 Congressional Hearing). Either way, the conduct of CRS is utterly indefensible.

CRS literature claims that CRS strives "to address the causes.. and to further social justice". Yet, in the words of one CRS official interviewed in New York, "the term human rights makes us uncomfortable around here". According to its spokemen, CRS is a humanitarian relief organisation which must remain a-political and neutral if it is to effectively fulfil its relief responsibilities. According to Carter Smith its only purpose in going to East Timor was to save lives. To have deviated from this single objective would have been a dereliction of its duty to the people for it could have brought about its expulsion by the Indonesian government.

Thus CRS officials in New York steadfastly refused to concede any responsibilities other than relief. Human rights, the argument went, involves politics and political activity is both a breach of the CRS charter and unacceptable to the American Catholic public who support CRS - as the many letters received indicate. (One might ask does this mean CRS has no educative, leadership role within the US community?) Family reunions, 'disappearances', executions without trial, political imprisonments and the like, not to mention self-determination, are not on the CRS East Timor agenda. Furthermore, I was told, Asiatics do not view human rights as we do. The concerns being represented, I replied, were those of the East Timorese themselves and, indeed, to some extent, of the US State Department whose Bureau of Human Rights had included East Timor in its 1979 Country Report on Indonesia. The same thinking would seem to preclude working through another agency such as the Church Office of International Justice and Peace - though both agencies are part of the same organisation, the US Catholic Bishops' Conference. Ed Doherty, an adviser to the Office of International Justice and Peace, was, for example, included in a CRS mission to Vietnam in his capacity as a human rights officer. A similar initiative in regard to East Timor, I was told, would be a policy matter for the director of CRS, Bishop Broderick, to decide. Don Crosson and John Donnelly refused to accept my suggestion that they raise the matter with the Bishop, saying that it would exceed their responsibilities as program directors. If I wished to raise it, their insistent advice was that I should do so with the aging and kindly Mgr Landi.

ICRC, for its part, is less shy of human rights issues. Though critical of inaccuracies in Amnesty International's reports, ICRC acknowledges that abuses of human rights are being perpetrated in East Timor and that it has responsibilities in this area. Its contract with the Indonesian Red Cross restricts ICRC to relief work. Nevertheless it believes its mere presence serves as a control and it is engaged quietly in behind the scenes work particularly in the areas of tracing and the repatriation of Portuguese citizens. There are some 180 Portuguese citizens in East Timor whose plight resembles that of the US hostages in Iran. According to informed observers the Indonesian government is detaining these forgotten would-be refugees in the hope of extracting political concessions from the Portuguese Government in return for their release. **

**

It is appropriate at this point to draw attention to provisions regarding 'disappearances' established by the UN Division of Human Rights in Geneva. This Division is prepared to act immediately on receipt of information regarding missing persons. It should be noted, however, that Indonesia

Although it had testified at an earlier Congressional Hearing in December 1979, CRS - the principal channel of US aid to East Timor, was conspicuously absent from the Congressional Hearing into aid in East Timor, held in Washington on June 10, 1980.

When asked why CRS had not attended, the Deputy Executive Director of CRS, Mgr Alfred Landi, replied that CRS knew nothing of the Hearing and had received no invitation. He later corrected this after the CRS Director, Bishop Edwin Broderick, informed him that CRS had been contacted about the Hearing but that the invitation to attend had been extended to Frank Carlin in person, not to CRS as an organisation. According to the Bishop, since Carlin was ill at the time and unable to attend, CRS had taken the matter no further.

In fact, Gary Bombardier, an aide to Congressional Committeeman Matthew McHugh, asked Bishop Broderick if Carlin could testify or, should he be unavailable, if someone else from CRS could appear. The Congressional Sub-Committee Office also separately contacted CRS in Washington with a similar request.

It further transpired that not only had John Donnelly of CRS' Head Office in New York, prepared a report for the Hearing, but Frank Carlin was in the USA at the time of the Hearing, knew of the Hearing and had volunteered to the US Embassy in Jakarta before travelling home on leave that he was willing to testify.

Whatever Bishop Broderick's reasons for shielding CRS from public scrutiny, there is no doubt the absence of the star witness from the Hearing significantly impaired the quality of the proceedings.

Conclusions

The power which CRS enjoys derives from the associated factors of its size and its patronage by governments. It therefore sees itself as an entity in its own right which is big enough to go it alone independently of its colleagues and the public. It values independence over collegiality and partnership.

Its reference points are governments and their perspectives rather than NGO's or peoples' movements.

Its declared policy of a-politicism, which it sees as a strength, is also a weakness making it attractive to repressive governments who know they can exploit its passivity to their advantage.

Unlike ICRC, cooperation has become collaboration for CRS. At no stage,

---

(cont. from previous page)

is not a signatory to the Charter and two Covenants which contain the UN definition of human rights. The Division of Human Rights supplied the following text:

NOTE ON THE SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION ON THE ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE OF A PERSON

Reports of the enforced or involuntary disappearance of a person may be transmitted to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances care of the Director, Division of Human Rights, United Nations Office at Geneva, Palais des Nations, Geneva 1211, Switzerland.

Experience has shown that information on the enforced or involuntary disappearances of a person varies greatly in detail by reason of the nature of each case and the surrounding circumstances, While it is important in dealing effectively with reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances to have as much information as possible, the fact that all details are not available should not prevent the submission of such reports. Information on the enforced or involuntary disappearance of a peron may be submitted in any written form. In submitting such reports consideration may be given to preparing a narrative summary of the events and to providing, to the extent practicable, the information listed on the attached suggested format.

Urgent reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances in which immediate action might be effective to save lives should be made, preferably by cable or telex, to the Chairman of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, address as above, cable address UNATION GENEVA; telex 28 96 96. The person or organisation making the report should be clearly identified and an address and telephone number should also be given where contact with them can be made.

privately or publicly, has any CRS official working directly on the East Timor program, defended any facet of the broad struggle of the Timorese. On the contrary, CRS has been defensive of Indonesia.

A hidden agenda based on crude 'anti-communism' and a western concept of world order is a powerful driving force at work within CRS.

VI The US Congressional Hearing into aid to East Timor, June 10 1980

Authorisation to attend the Congressional Hearing in Washington on behalf of ACFOA was granted at the ACFOA Executive meeting on May 29, 1980. As this decision came too late to organise the submission of testimony, I attended the Hearing as an observer.

Congressmen Clarence Long (Chairman), Matthew McHugh, and Julian Dixon of the House Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations conducted the Hearing during the course of one afternoon. An estimated 100 correspondents, embassy representatives and others were turned away from the 60-seat capacity small Hearing room.

The following summary will suffice here as the full text of the proceedings will soon be available.

Testimonies were taken from four witnesses:

1. Richard Holbrooke (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific) supported by John Negroponte (State Department) and Paul Gardiner (US Embassy Jakarta). Holbrooke stressed the importance of Indonesia as an oil-producing, Moslem, populous nation and its close friendship with the USA (evident from Indonesia's endorsement of US policy on the hostages in Iran, the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, and its assistance to Indo-China refugees). His main argument was twofold. The humanitarian situation inside East Timor, whilst still needing attention, had dramatically improved. Secondly, this improvement and other changes such as increased access to East Timor by foreigners were proof that the US policy of staying on side with Indonesia worked better than a policy of public criticism. Nevertheless he conceded that there had been no genuine act of self-determination in Timor; that the country had been taken over by force of arms - supplied in part by the USA; that there had been a large death-toll; that aid had been corrupted to varying degrees; and that there was no free emigration.

2. Fr Francisco Fernandes (Honorary Chairman of the East Timorese Refugees Commission in Lisbon) testified that the basic aspiration of the East Timorese,both inside and outside Timor, was self-determination, not integration and that while aid was necessary it was not the solution to the problem of East Timor which is a problem of justice not charity.

3. Admiral Gene la Rocque (Director of the Centre for Defence Information, Washington) testified that Indonesia was not strategically important to US defence and that, far from abetting Indonesia's military takeover of East Timor (which is also no threat to America), the USA should use its undeniable influence over Indonesia to acheive justice for the Timorese. He had hoped, he concluded, that America's experience with the Shah would have taught it the consequences of alliances with unpopular, repressive regimes.

4. David Hinkley (Chairman, Amnesty International USA) assisted by Anthony Goldstone (Amnesty UK), testified that Indonesia was guilty of widespread abuses of human rights in Timor and that Amnesty was particularly concerned with the conditions of political prisoners and those who have disappeared.

No testimonies were delivered by either CRS or the Indonesian Government.

The examination of the aid situation concentrated on three areas:

first, the extent of improvement in the food and medical situation since October 1979 when the ICRC and CRS began their programs. It was generally agreed that there had been an improvement but the situation remains serious.

second, the extent of the corruption or diversion of aid: estimates varied between 5% and 50%, with the Congressmen, in my judgement, sceptical of the minimum figure.

third, the minimum foreign presence in East Timor to manage the multi-million dollar US program: again, the Congressmen, in my judgement, were sceptical that the current arrangement was adequate.

Comments

No examination of the aid situation in East Timor could hope to be complete without testimony from, and scrutiny of, the CRS and Indonesian Government programs. It is regrettable, therefore, that neither CRS nor Indonesia were represented. It is also regrettable that ACFOA, as an NGO which has worked in Timor but is now denied access, did not testify.

Long term development was mentioned only in passing and there was no discussion of the politics of the aid programs.

No summing up or recommendations were offered by the Committee at the conclusion of the Hearing. Brought up to expect big things of the US Congress, one was left wondering just what, if anything, it was going to do about the long list of admissions and charges that had been laid before it.

The smallness of the room used for the Hearing would seem to be inconsistent with the public and democratic character of a Hearing.

VII Australian NGO aid to East Timor : a recommendation

Although the grave crisis of 1978-80 has been overcome, there is still a serious need for both relief and developmental aid in East Timor. Indeed, according to all sources, the anticipated departure of ICRC and CRS in October 1980 might well have precipitated a new crisis. **

In view of this need, what options are open to the Australian NGO's?

The possibilities of an on-the-spot assesssment, not to mention working there in their own right, are clearly out of the question for the foreseeable future. Many Australian agency requests during 1980 for access have been turned down. Overseas agencies have had a similar experience. Oxfam UK, for example, which as a contributor to the CRS program has some basis on which to negotiate entry, has been denied access despite the persistent efforts of its Semarang-based representative, Richard Holloway.

Australian NGO's are left, then, with the option of either dropping their involvement or, more responsibly, pursuing a line already explored but not acted on, of working through an already established channel. It should be noted that this dilemma is not unique to the Australian agencies. CORSO, CAFOD, CCFD and OXFAM Belgique, to name a few, share the same frustration and sense of responsibility.

The Australian NGO's choice of an appropriate channel must be guided by generally accepted aid principles such as insurance that the aid reaches the people, that they participate in and control the projects, that their cultural values and dignity are respected, that proper assessment is possible, and that the aid is not politically exploited.

The ICRC-IRC, CRS, DGI and Indonesian Government programs are all questionable on one or more of these grounds. The principle qualification to make about them is that, in one way or another, they work with the Indonesian military with all that that entails for the people in occupied East Timor.

The only viable and proper alternative, at the moment, is the Catholic Church in East Timor - a channel which, incidentally, Australian Catholic Relief and a number of overseas Catholic agencies have used since 1977. Many in a position to know advise the same course. These include senior Timorese in the Indonesian administration, senior Indonesian churchmen, and officials of both ICRC and CRS.

Not only is the Catholic Church in Timor the only Timorese NGO intact

and

**
Since this recommendation was put to the Australian NGO's, both ICRC and CRS have had their contracts renewed. ICRC will continue until April 1981 when the situation will again be reviewed. The duration of the CRS program is not known.

and functional (leaving aside the situation of Fretilin), it also has the confidence of the people as this report has indicated above. Furthermore, the Timorese Church has demonstrated its general, though limited, competence as an aid organisation - a competence I am confident will increase in proportion to the input received from progressive elements within MAWI (the Indonesian Bishops Conference).

My firm recommendation is, then, that the Australian NGO's, together and/or separately, should channel funds to the Church in East Timor for use in small, on-going local projects - rather than attempting large-scale relief. Since it is not possible to channel aid direct to East Timor, such funds would be transmitted via the Jakarta-based Indonesian Bishops Conference aid organisation, LPPS, which, while not working directly in East Timor, does serve as a conduit acceptable to the East Timor church. **

The East Timorese responsible for the aid work of the Church in Timor are the Social Delegate of the Dili diocese, Fr Monteiro, and the Vicar General of the Dili diocese, Fr Ricardo.

Finally, it should be noted that this channel is distinct from that known as Karya Kasih (cf. section on Protestant Churches and Timor, above).

VIII East Timorese refugees in Portugal and Jakarta

Note: it is important to note that this section was written for presentation to Australian NGO's in August, six weeks before the Australian Government announced its Special Humanitarian Program for Timorese refugees on October 7, 1980. However it is still relevant at this point on two counts. First it underlines the importance of the Australian government decision. And second, the situation it describes still remains as the movement of people from Portugal (and Jakarta) has only just begun.

a) Portugal

There are between 1600 and 2000 East Timorese refugees in Portugal. Some are the remnants of the 1400 people who came from West Timor in 1976. The rest comprise about 800 Chinese who have come from East Timor in the past 12 months on Portuguese passports after their attempts to get to Australia failed. About 500 of the original 1400 who came from Timor in 1976 have been admitted to Australia on the basis of family reunions. Some of the recent arrivals will also eventually be admitted here on the same basis. Most of the remainder are deeply frustrated because they want to come to Australia but know they will never satisfy the normal migration requirements which is, currently, the only way open to them.

The refugees are located in some 20 different centres around Lisbon. About half - and most of these are the original 1976 arrivals, live in two camps (Balteiro and Graca) about a kilometre apart some 20 kms from the centre of Lisbon. The rest are accommodated in hostels and apartments. I confined my visits to the camps because I felt a stronger obligation to those who have been there the longest and whose living conditions are apparently the worst.

The camps are shanty towns reminiscent of our shameful Aboriginal settlements. Children play beside open drains which overflow in winter turning the ungrassed, unpaved camp area into a quagmire. Facilities are minimal. The toilet and laundry block are shared in common as in a caravan park. Water has to be carried to the houses from taps in the open. Women scrub clothes on rocks under the trees in the old way. The houses, with their annexes of canvas and plastic sheeting, are too small and either too hot or too cold. A shed serves as a bar where the unemployed wile away the hours. The expense of travelling to and from Lisbon adds to the isolation. They are fringe-dwellers, not living normal integrated lives as the Timorese do in Australia.

** *The recommendation that this aid channel be used was accepted by both the agencies present at the August 20, 1980 meeting (see page 1) and by the ACFOA Annual Council held in September 1980.*

One is struck by the limbo quality of the situation. The old world of Timor has been left behind in ruins and has gone a way they do not accept. News from relatives there is invariably shattering. They are not Portuguese, except in the technical sense, and the future is a question mark. This insecurity and impermanence has contributed to a number of inevitable social problems though, extraordinarily enough, nothing outstanding was reported. UDT and Fretilin tensions persist and it is generally believed that Indonesia has spies in the camps. Unemployment and boredom are prevalent. The East Timorese have generally been less successful than the other one million or so 'returnees' from Portugal's other former colonies. As one of the poorest groups in one of the poorest societies in Europe, their future prospects in Portugal are far from bright.

The Portuguese government does what it can. Food is delivered regularly - though most find it unpalatable, and a basic allowance and medical service are provided. The fact that the people are together is important. They have built on that very well. The community structure is well organised in a relatively democratic way but would benefit from more dynamic leadership. Sports teams, choirs of an excellent standard (at least two records have been cut and numerous concerts given), and cultural activities aimed at preserving their identity and tradition, are regular features.

Once it was known I was from Australia and an aid organisation, many approached me for help to get family out of Timor or to get to Australia. But there were no complaints. I would defy anyone - including the Minister for Immigration and officers from his department, to go there and not be moved by their situation and beautiful spirit.

CRS Portugal, ICEM (Intergovernmental Commission on European Migration), and the Portuguese Catholic Migration office, all assist in various ways.

Recommendation

The aid agencies should press the Australian government to admit these people to Australia under a special program.

This is clearly in line with earlier ACFOA resolutions on the matter. It was the recommendation of the Traill Report, and it has been publicised as one of the aims of the East Timor Relief Appeal since its inception in November 1979. RAFT (the campaign to Reunite in Australia the Families of Timor) was launched in May 1980 to acheive this, inter alia.

The case for special consideration for these people is a good one. Their aspiration is to come here. In Australia they would find the security and opportunities unavailable in Portugal. Many have families here in what is now the largest community of Timorese outside Timor. The experience of Timorese already in Australia demonstrates quite clearly that additional Timorese would quite easily find work and integrate well into Australian society. A special intake of 2000, and not all want to come, would constitute but a fraction of the 80.000 migrants allowed for this year and would not create great technical, social or financial problems for the Australian community. There is every reason to think the Australian community is sympathetic and would welcome them. The Northern Territory Government, for example, in its drive to populate the North, has singled out the Timorese for special consideration in any program.

What is required is a vigorous, concerted drive by the Australian aid agencies, mindful that there is a Federal election later this year.

The Timorese Refugees Commission in Lisbon has been requested to prepare a list of all who want to come to Australia. I was able to publicise the idea through the media in Portugal. CRS and ICEM both wholeheartedly support the special program proposal as the best chance for these people and will assist the Timorese with manpower and finance to prepare their case. In Geneva I met will equal enthusiasm from ICMC (International Catholic Migration Commission), WCC (World Council of Churches) and UNHCR (UN High Commission for Refugees). The UNHCR, for protocol reasons, would have to wait on an approach from the Timorese themselves before taking up the matter, but they definitely recognise the Timorese as refugees in all but name and accept a responsibility for them.

In the short term, ICEM would welcome some financial assistance from the Australian aid agencies to upgrade their English language program and defray the travel costs of Timorese to make it easier for them to attend. It is clear some pre-migration instruction in English will enhance the resettlement process here, will benefit them as a skill per se, and provide a useful spare time activity.

b) Jakarta

Over 100 Chinese Timorese are now in Jakarta hoping to make their way to either Australia or Portugal. Australia is their first choice, however few satisfy Australian migration requirements, and most are not on the agreed list of 600.

Most are young people, many of them married with small children. They have bribed their way from Dili to Jakarta, obtaining short-duration travel permits (surat jalan) which quickly expire leaving them in a vulnerable situation. Some have been in Jakarta many months without work and depend on relatives overseas to meet the costs of accommodation and survival.

NOTE: THE NEW AUSTRALIAN SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM FOR TIMORESE

Since the above report was prepared, the Australian Government has announced a new deal for Timorese outside Timor. Effective from October 7, 1980, the Special Humanitarian Program declares that all Timorese outside East Timor by September 30, 1980 are now eligible for admission to Australia provided they have a blood relative who has lived in Australia for at least 12 months, who will nominate them, provide initial accommodation and help them look for work on their arrival in Australia.

Timorese in Lisbon, Macao, Taiwan, and Jakarta will benefit.

Regrettably, this arrangment does not cover all Timorese who wish to come to Australia. Those without relatives in Australia have been excluded. This means at least 30% of those in Portugal will miss out, as well as a scattering of people in Macao, Taiwan and Jakarta.

The program also makes no mention of the rest of the 600 on the agreed list still in East Timor. Nor were any provisions made for others still in East Timor whose case for admission to Australia is undeniable. They are the parents and families of isolated children in Australia and the rest of the 2668 members of extended families nominated by relatives in Australia in 1977.

In the light of this announcement and its inadequacies, RAFT and the Australian aid agencies have revised their family reunion objectives as follows. The aims of the campaign are now:

a. to bring from East Timor for family reunion in Australia
   - the rest of the 600 on the agreed list
   - the parents and families of isolated children in Australia
   - the rest of the 2668 nominated in 1977

b. to bring from Portugal and elsewhere those Timorese who wish to immigrate to Australia but do not satisfy the conditions of the Special Humanitarian Program.

IX The reunion of the 600 on the agreed list

Mr Pat Carracher, the Immigration Officer at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, readily supplied me with the following statistics.

The list agreed to in July 1978 by Indonesia and Australia comprised 613 names. 26 have been added since (comprising, e.g. new born children of those on the list) and some names have been taken off due to death, illness or voluntary withdrawal. The precise number now on the approved list is not known but it is of the order of 600.

As of August 5, 1980, 302 of the 600 have been admitted to Australia, plus another 126 not on the list who have satisfied normal migration criteria or who have been admitted on the basis of special consideration (e.g. a blind boy - and as such a prohibited immigrant, was admitted on compassionate grounds. His parents and six brothers and sisters were in Australia, and his four companions in Jakarta would not come without him in case, left alone, he met with an accident).

285 of the 600 are still in East Timor. 134 of these are Chinese and 151 are Timorese. Of the 303 on the list who have come, only 19 have been Timorese, the rest Chinese.

The Australian embassy gives top priority to the processing of Timorese applicants. They travel on Portuguese passports issued by the Netherlands Embassy which represents Portugal - Portugal's diplomatic relations with Jakarta having been severed at the time of the Indonesian invasion. Processing by the Australian Government (which involves medical and character clearances, the passing of documents to and from Canberra etc.) takes a month at the outside. The cost of airfares and paper work for those on the 600 list is covered by the Australian government. A volunteer Chinese-speaking Indonesian provides invaluable help. Debriefing of refugees on the situation inside Timor is not permitted. Representations to the Indonesian authorities on the slow pace of the program are made regularly by Embassy officers. "We are doing everything we are allowed to do" (within the framework of Indonesia-Australia relations).

Despite the agreement and the approved list, however, there is essentially no free emigration from East Timor. Apart from the 99 who came in February 1979 - after the one and only visit to Dili the Indonesian Government has permitted Australian immigration officers to make, all have to make their own way to the Australian embassy before the Australian government can help them. Embassy staff believe that the problem could be cleared up within a very short time if access to Dili was permitted or if all the people came together to Jakarta. It is interesting to note that a proposal put to the Australian Government late in 1979 by ACFOA that RAAF planes ferrying aid to Dili could carry the rest of the 600 on their return flight to Australia, was considered by the Immigration Department only to be rejected on advice from the Embassy in Jakarta that Indonesia was not likely to cooperate and not enough time was available to organise the airlift.

People must obtain a travel permit (surat jalan) - usually valid for two weeks, to leave East Timor and an exit permit to leave Jakarta. Heavy bribes are exacted for both documents by Hankam in Dili and Jakarta. Amounts paid vary from $1500 to $3000 a person and depend on factors such as ability to pay and the disposition of those controlling the racket. For example, it is likely more is exacted at times like Lebaran when extra funds are sought for travel and gifts. Refugees raise the money by sale of property and with help from relatives abroad. This corruption is widely known and admitted to in Jakarta.

Chinese Timorese were arriving in Jakarta from Dili at the time of my visit and have continued to come since.

I raised the continued separation of the 600 with a broad range of people in Jakarta. These included members of Golkar, the Indonesian Parliament, lawyers groups, representatives of ICRC and CRS, and senior members of the Catholic and Protestant churches.

All appreciated the frustrations of the separated Timorese families and expressed dismay at the continued delays. Some Indonesians charged that the separations were a violation of basic human rights. Opinions on what should be done varied considerably.

One Australian Embassy officer argued that 'softly,softly' best described the course to be taken because pressure through public criticism of Indonesia was counter-productive. Another Embassy officer pointed out, however, that even when things were quiet and cooperative after the arrival of the 99 early in 1979, still no more people were allowed out.

CRS officials in Jakarta were aware of the problem but said it lay outside their charter which restricts CRS to aid and development, exclusive of human rights.

The ICRC delegate in Jakarta, while sympathetically aware of the problem, said ICRC only involved itself in these matters when there was no other authority involved. Hence it was quietly working on the repatriation of Portuguese nationals from East Timor, but not on the reunion of the 600 since two governments had already taken up the matter.

Officers of the DGI (Indonesian Council of Churches) and MAWI (Catholic Bishops Conference) were most sympathetic and agreed to place the matter on their agenda and raise it with the Government.

An MP, soon to visit the Catholic Church in East Timor, attempted to organise meetings for me with Sudomo of Kopkamtib and Dr Mochtar, the Foreign Minister. Neither was available owing to prior commitments during the busy week leading up to the President's Report to the Nation and the August 17 Independence celebrations.

Two Indonesian legal institutes agreed to examine the matter.

General Benny Moerdani is said to control the family reunion program.

In Geneva the UNHCR explained that it had approached the Indonesian Mission there on the basis of the UN General Assemby resolution of Nov. 1979 which called on the UNHCR to intervene. Indonesian officials were courteously uncooperative. Indonesia generally refuses to deal with any UN agency on anything related to East Timor because of UN support for an act of self-determination in East Timor. Indonesia does not make any distinction between the political and humanitarian functions of the UN. It has allowed the UNHCR, however, to recently establish an office in Jakarta to deal with Vietnamese refugees.

Recommendations

General Jusuf, the Minister for Defence and Commander of the armed forces in East Timor, should be directly approached by the Australian ambassador to Indonesia.

More needs to be done to highlight the problem in forums such as the UN, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Christian Conference of Asia, the Catholic Church and appropriate migration and refugee bodies.

Indonesian authorities such as President Suharto, Dr Mochtar, Jusuf, Moerdani and Sudomo should be contacted directly. Australian aid agencies should publicise the situation and call for action amongst their international networks.

Various Indonesian groups must be encouraged to take up the matter.

It is counter-productive for the Indonesian government not to honour a program bi-laterally agreed to.

Pat Walsh

Christmas 1980

Appendix: media interviews (7.6.80 - 18.8.80)

NC News Service (New York)
Religious News Service (New York)
Catholic Herald (London)
Guardian (London)
BBC - Indonesian/Malay service
A'rea (Torres Vedras, Portugal)
Portugal Hoje (Lisbon)
A Capital (Lisbon)
ABC A.M. (from Lisbon)
ABC Correspondents Report (from Washington)
Le Courrier (Geneva)
IFM (Amsterdam)
Trouw (Amsterdam)
De Waarheid (Amsterdam)
Radio NBC (Hilversum)
Vermoed Nederland (The Hague)
NRC (Amsterdam)
NCRV Radio (Amsterdam)
El Pais (Spain)